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ABSTRACT
Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) circuits are finding widespread use due to increasing adop-
tion of IoT devices. However, the existing strong PUFs such as Arbiter PUFs (APUF) and its compo-
sitions are susceptible to machine learning (ML) attacks because the challenge-response pairs have
a linear relationship. In this paper, we present a Recurrent-Neural-Network PUF (RNN-PUF) which
uses a combination of feedback and XOR function to significantly improve resistance to ML attack,
without significant reduction in the reliability. ML attack is also partly reduced by using a shared
comparator with offset-cancellation to remove bias and save power. From simulation results, we
obtain ML attack accuracy of 62% for different ML algorithms, while reliability stays above 93%.
This represents a 33.5% improvement in our Figure-of-Merit. Power consumption is estimated to be
12.3µWwith energy/bit of ≈ 0.16pJ.
1 Introduction
Device connectivity in the Internet of Things (IoT) is predicted to increase exponentially while electronics usage
in automobiles has also increased significantly. With the arrival of self-driving-automobile technology, the role of
hardware security will only get more important. PUFs provide a safe way to generate unique identification(ID) or
authentication bits, compared with non-volatile memories that can be hacked using widely known techniques. Both
analog and digital circuit techniques have been used to design PUFs [1, 2, 3], with a preference for sub-threshold
analog techniques for low power operation. There are two kinds of PUFs, weak and strong [4], with the weak one
used solely for ID, while the strong one being used for authentication and/or ID. Strong PUFs have a large challenge-
response pair (CRP) space such that an attacker cannot predict the response of some arbitrary challenge even though
he has knowledge of many other CRPs. However, several mathematical models have been developed for existing
strong PUFs, largely using machine learning (ML) techniques to learn the expected patterns of the PUF’s CRPs[5].
Alternative design strategies using analog components have been proposed like in [6, 7] with improved resistance than
the classic Arbiter PUF. In this paper, we present a technique to significantly decrease the machine learning attack
accuracy (MLAA) more specifically for analog PUFs using neural-networks (NN), without being heavily penalized
on reliability. Our RNN-PUF uses a combination of recurrence, or feedback, and XOR to generate a response whose
relationship with the particular challenge is obscured to the attacker due to the randomness provided by the previous
response.
Our contributions in this work are as follows:
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Figure 1: Architecture of Conventional NN-PUF
• We first show high MLAA of a recently proposed analog NN-PUF thus showing that analog PUFs are not
inherently robust against ML attacks.
• We propose a simple method to reduce MLAA for the NN-PUF at the cost of more area.
• We propose the RNN-PUF that has both low MLAA and low area.
• We propose a design guide for the RNN-PUF where area and MLAA/reliability are traded-off.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the conventional PUF based on current mirror arrays (CMA).
Section 3 introduces the RNN-PUF, its operational details and its reliability/accuracy. Section 4 discusses the design
guide, while Section 5 presents power consumption simulations and comparison with state-of-art. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 The Conventional NN-PUF
The conventional PUF without recurrence is based on a 128 × 128 Neural-Network PUF [8] using CMA with high
mismatch. We choose the NN-PUF as the base PUF because it can be reused for ML, another important functionality
becoming ubiquitous in IoT [9]. Also, it has the least area per bit reported so far. Similar arrays may be constructed out
of the current mirrors reported in [7, 10]. Figure 1 shows the schematic of the conventional NN-PUF. A 1-bit response
is generated by comparing the output current in a column pair specified by the column challenge. The row challenge
bits selects which row of transistors are active. The current values for each column of the column pair are summed up,
and the two results are sent to the comparator to generate 1(ICcol,A > I
C
col,B) or 0(I
C
col,A < I
C
col,B) where I
C
col,A denotes
the current output for column A given a challenge C. The only difference is we show a shared comparator while [8]
used current controlled oscillators (CCO) to digitize the current values. We note that the maximum number of possible
column pairs is
(
ncol
2
)
where ncol is the number of columns. However we can only get
ncol
2
independent column pairs,
because if we know that ICcol,X > I
C
col,Y and I
C
col,Y > I
C
col,Z , then we know for sure that I
C
col,X > I
C
col,Z [4].
2.1 Conventional NN-PUF Reliability
In order to improve reliability of the NN-PUF, it was shown in [8] that we can use a dynamic threshold control,
Vctrl, but it comes at the cost of discarding more CRPs. In that scheme, a response is considered valid if and only if
|ICcol,X − I
C
col,Y | > Vctrl. If invalid, a different challenge has to be used.
Figure 2 shows the reliability of the conventional PUF against Vctrl, for 5000 CRPs. Reliability is defined as the
probability of 1-bit output being correct across different operating conditions such as temperature/voltage/time etc. As
shown in [8], we also observed that reliability variation with temperature is far more dominant than other effects. So
we will use this worst-case reliability at−45◦C for our analysis going forward. The reliability of this NN-PUF without
recurrence can be denoted Rconv–this notation will be useful when we talk about reliability of the RNN-PUF.
2
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Figure 2: Conventional NN-PUF Reliability variation against Vctrl
Figure 3: Conventional PUF ML Accuracy - Linear SVM
2.2 Conventional NN-PUF ML Attack Accuracy
The idea of using ML to predict responses of PUFs is well known [5, 11]. We attempt to use different ML algorithms
to predict the response to a given challenge. To assess ML resistance of the basic structure, initially the column pair
part of the challenge is kept fixed i.e. it is not randomized for different row part of the challenge. Using Linear Support
Vector Machine(LSVM), we obtained the results shown in Figure 3. Since the accuracy exceeds the reliability for 800
CRPs, we can use this number to denote the secure space of the conventional PUF [12]. The results are not surprising
because the conventional current-mirror-based PUF, for a fixed column pair, is similar to the APUF that has been
accurately modeled before. The linear relationship between challenge and response is easily learned by the LSVM
with very few training CRPs. This result shows that even analog PUFs are prone to ML attacks and there is nothing
inherently secure about analog PUFs–careful design is necessary.
Another problem with conventional PUFs such as that shown in [6, 8] is the low Hamming Distance Test [13] value
of the output due to the comparator’s bias, which biases the output toward 0 or 1, and makes it easier to predict the
response. For the NN-PUF in [8], this can be modeled as a gain factor kX multiplying the output current I
C
col,X of the
X-th column.
3 Proposed RNN-PUF
In order to improve over a conventional PUF’s attack susceptibility, we propose the design of an RNN-PUF, whose
concept is shown in Figure 4(a). Feed-forward Neural networks such as Extreme Learning Machine have been imple-
mented in hardware before [8] and used in dual-mode as a PUF. Our hypothesis was if we use the idea of Recurrent
Neural Networks for a PUF, it may improve resistance to Machine Learning attacks by introducing non-linearity in the
CRP space through the feedback mechanism. However, this means that one needs as many fed-back bits as there are
number of challenge bits. A high number of output bits to be fed-back increases both power and area, and also reduces
3
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Figure 4: (a) Recurrent Neural Network PUF concept (b) Circuit-level RNN-PUF core (c) High speed comparator
with offset cancellation
reliability. In order to avoid these issues, we propose another improvement wherein we XOR the feedback bits with
the challenge bits.
The core of the RNN-PUF is an array of current mirrors with a shared comparator at the output, as shown in Figures
4(b) and 4(c). If there are A rows of current mirrors and N bits are fed back, then each feedback bit is XOR-ed with
A/N challenge bits to produce the new challenge after feedback. By sharing the comparator, we can drastically cut
down power consumption compared with individual comparators for each column pair. Additionally, by using offset-
cancellation we can remove the comparator bias. Another free parameter for the RNN-PUF is θ, the number of times
recurrence is applied before producing the final output bit. We will show a design space exploration for choosing N
and θ in Section 4.
3.1 RNN-PUF ML Attack Accuracy
To make a fair comparison, we first showMLAA reduction by using a shared comparator for the RNN-PUF as opposed
to using CCO for each column pair for the conventional PUF. For these results, we randomize the column pair selection
and disable recurrence, i.e., it is just a conventional PUF but without the comparator’s bias. The results are shown in
Table 1 and are generated using 50, 000 CRPs using 5-fold cross-validation. There is considerable improvement by
averaging out the comparator’s bias, and we get a much stronger PUF against ML attacks.
Now we enable recurrence for the RNN-PUF and use a shared comparator to remove bias. Although the NN-PUF
with randomized column pairs is very resistant to MLAA, Figure 5 shows that we can design the RNN-PUF (N = 2,
θ = 1) with much fewer columns of current mirrors (and hence much smaller area) for the same MLAA compared
Table 1: ML attack accuracies: conventional NN-PUF with and without comparator bias
W/ comp. bias W/o comp. bias
Deep NN 71.14% 52.74%
Linear SVM 51.3% 50.7%
Bag/Boost Trees 63.5% 50.9%
4
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Figure 5: MLAA (Boosted Trees) comparison for NN-PUF and RNN-PUF, 25,000 CRPs for each
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Figure 6: MLAA for 128× 128 RNN-PUF with θ=1 andN=2 vs. number of training CRPs.
with the NN-PUF. As with the conventional PUF ML tests, we fix the final column pair selection while intermediate
cycle column pair selections are random. MLAA’s for several algorithms are shown in Figure 6, for 50, 000 CRPs
and Vctrl = 0. An accuracy of close to 50% means that the RNN-PUF (with N = 2, θ = 1) is very resilient to ML
attacks and the predictability of the response is a 50-50 guess. Higher order SVMs such as Cubic SVM also show
MLAA of around 50%, so their results are not shown here. Advanced ML algorithms such as Ensemble Classifiers or
Boosted/Bagged Trees are known to be more effective at breaking strong PUFs [5, 14] compared to SVMs. However
even these algorithms are unable to break the RNN-PUF, showing the effectiveness of the nonlinear structure due to
recurrence. These results are all the more effective because even if a hacker has physical access to the RNN-PUF,
he wouldn’t be able to access the intermediate output of the RNN-PUF, without tampering with and destroying the
PUF circuitry. As a result trying to model the RNN-PUF by getting the intermediate bits would be difficult even with
sophisticated equipment.
It would be useful to learn how the RNN-PUF compares with other PUFs that have had non-linearity introduced into
them. Two such PUFs are the XOR APUF and Feed-Forward APUF(FF-APUF), both of which have been attacked
usingML techniques [5, 15, 16]. In the x-XORAPUF, xAPUF outputs are XOR-ed, and one response bit is generated.
This is like XOR-ing several column pair outputs of the conventional NN-PUF; hence, it is not similar to our RNN-
PUF since we have both XOR-ing and cascading operations. In the FF-APUF, x bits are generated at random locations
within an APUF, and are then fed as part of the challenge bits to the rest of the APUF delay chain. This is comparable
to feeding back output bits of the conventional NN-PUF as the challenge, without XOR-ing. Thus, it is safe to say
that no attacks have been performed on APUF-like structures that use both XOR-ing and cascading, which is what
the RNN-PUF is based on. A PUF construction that’s closest to the RNN-PUF is the composite PUF in [17], but no
modeling attacks have been discussed.
5
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Figure 8: (a) Reliability vs. N for θ = 1. (b) Reliability vs. θ forN = 2.
3.2 RNN-PUF Reliability
Reliability of the RNN-PUF can be decomposed into the reliability of an XOR and cascade of PUFs [17]. Figure 7
shows the RNN-PUF as a composition of PUFs. This idea will help us relate the RNN-PUF reliability to a conventional
PUF’s reliability. We first analyze reliability mathematically for XOR operation and for cascade operation separately,
and then combine them for the final analysis. XOR and cascade reliabilities are given by [17]:
RXOR = R1R2 + (1−R1)(1 −R2) (1)
Rcas = R1R2 (2)
where R1 and R2 are individual reliabilities of any process/variable. We analyze the reliabilities as a function of N
and θ, where N is the number of intermediate bits feedback, and θ is the number of recurrences.ForRXOR, R1 is the
reliability of a bit feedback from the PUF, while R2 is the reliability of the challenge bits, which is just 1. So RXOR
just reduces to R1. For Rcas, assuming θ = 1 and N = 1, R1 is the reliability of the PUF output, while R2 is the
reliability of the PUF behind in the chain, which is just RXOR = R1. So the final reliability is just Rcas = R
2
1
.
Therefore, the theoretical reliability can be modeled by a recursive equation:
RNθ = (R
N
θ−1)
N .Rconv (3)
where Rconv is the reliability of the NN-PUF, and (R
N
θ−1)
N is the reliability of N-bits after θ − 1 cycles. This is the
theoretical lower bound limit of the reliability. In practice, the reliability is observed to be higher because there is a
chance that the final output is the same, even though the intermediate bits are different. Ideally, the probability that the
final output is correct despite incorrect intermediate bits is 0.5. This notion can be expressed with another equation
where a correction term is added:
RNθ = (R
N
θ−1)
N .Rconv + 0.5.(1− (R
N
θ−1)
N )) (4)
where the second factor with the multiplier of 0.5 denotes the case when the final output is correct even though
intermediate bits are incorrect. We can improve the reliability by increasing Vctrl, but at the cost of reducing the CRP
secure space. We take care of optimizing this trade-off in our Design Guide in section 4.
Figures 8(a) and 8(b) show reliability as a function of N and θ. When choosing N , we make sure that N is less
than half the number of columns, so that we are always choosing independent column pairs to avoid low Hamming-
Distance-Test (HDT) values. We observe that the reliability drops as N or θ are increased–so we should just choose
low values of N and θ. We use these results in Section 4. Recurrence causes the reliability of the RNN-PUF to drop
compared with that of the conventional PUF, however the gain in ML attack accuracy far exceeds the loss in reliability.
6
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Figure 9: FoM comparison of 128× 128 RNN-PUF for different θ and N values.
Table 2: Comparison Table
ASPDAC’18 [3] FF-Arb [5] XOR-Arb [5] VLSI’17 [6] VLSI’17 [7] TCAS’17 [8] This Work
Array Size 32x2 72x2 128x3 64x64 (5x13)x2 128x128 64x8
Temp. Range, C - 27 to 70 - 0 to 80 -20 to 80 -45 to 90 -45 to 90
Reliability, % - 90.2 - 89 88 92.5 92a
MLAA, % 80 95.5 99 77b 60 95c 61
FoM, % - -5.3 - 12 28 -2.5 31
Energy/bit, pJ - - - 0.097 11 3.36 0.16
Technology FPGA 0.18um FPGA 28nm 0.13um 0.35um 65nm
a
Worst-case native reliability at 80C for fair comparison with [6] and [7], without any dynamic thresholding
b
For 10,000/64 = 156 CRPs/column, from Fig. 9 in [6]
c
For 200,000/64 = 3125 CRPs/col. pair from Fig. 3 in this paper
4 Design Guide for RNN-PUF
The RNN-PUF has 5 parameters that we can control: N , θ, Vctrl, number of Rows (A) and Columns (B). The FoM
used to compare the effect of parameters is the difference between reliability and MLAA:
FoM = MLAA−Reliability (5)
Figure 9 shows the RNN-PUF’s FoM for differentN and θ. We notice that MLAA immediately drops to around 50%
for N = 1 and θ=1 for 128x128 RNN-PUF with the reliability being the highest for these parameters. Increasing N
or θ decreases reliability–so increasing them does not improve the FoM too much as we see in Figure 9. As a result
it is better to go with low value of N , either 1 or 2, and θ=1. In this way, power consumption will also stay low since
only one or two column pairs are being used. We recommend using N = 2 since there is a higher chance that the
intermediate challenge is different from the original one and hence more difficult to predict.
If we keep the number of rows A fixed and increase number of columns B, we see a clear trend of decreasing MLAA
in Figure 10(a). Since reliability stays almost the same, so the FoM increases. However increasing the number of
columns increases area. Beyond B = 8 columns, the MLAA already drops to around 50%, and with reliability being
the same as just 2 columns, we note that 8 columns give sufficient performance.
Assuming B = 8, the number of rows needs to be at least A = 32. This is because for A = 16, there will only be
∼ 262,000 CRPs which can be cracked in few days using brute force method. If we go with A = 32, we do get a
high number of CRPs, but in order to get high reliability our Vctrl needs to be around 0.015 which means we lose 25%
of the CRPs. After losing these CRPs, we have secure space of ∼ 1010 CRPs which may or may not be sufficient to
withstand a brute-force attack, depending on how quickly the CRPs can be collected.
Furthermore, by having A = 32, we do not get sufficient entropy [14]. Figure 10(a) compares the FoM for A = 32
and 64. We can see that the FoM does not degrade forA = 64 due to worse reliability. As a result, we can confidently
choose 64 rows. In order to have enough CRPs, we go for 64x8 RNN-PUF with N = 2 and θ = 1. Using Figure
10(c) we pick Vctrl = 0.01–so we lose about 28% of the 191, 000 CRPs to achieve reliability of 95%. MLAA for the
remaining 138, 000 CRPs using several algorithms is around 61% at best, as seen in Figure 10(b), implying the FoM
7
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Figure 10: (a) Trade-off area vs. secure space (θ=1 and N=2) (b) MLAA for 64x8 RNN-PUF with θ=1 and N=2 (c)
Reliability-Vctrl plot for 64x8 RNN-PUF with θ=1 and N=2.
is still a respectable 36%. Figure 10(c) also shows the theoretical reliability plotted using Equation 4 and the lower
bound using Equation 3. We can observe that Equation 4 accurately models the actual reliability. In these equations,
we use the fact that Rθ=0 = Rconv, so we get Rθ=1 = R
3
conv + 0.5.(1−R
2
conv).
5 Power Consumption & Comparison
We estimate power consumption of the RNN-PUF by simulating the 64x8 array of current mirrors, shared comparator
and 64 XOR gates.Technology used is UMC 65nm with 1.2V supply voltage. Since the comparator is shared, N = 2
and θ = 1, the comparator burns power three times before we get the final output. All the 64 XORs are operated in
parallel; hence, latency for this operation is just that for 1 XOR gate. Total power consumed is 12.3µW , of which the
array and comparator consume 11.6µW , and the XORs just 0.7µW . The clock frequency used is 250MHz. From the
time of reset to obtaining the final output bit after recurrence takes about 13ns. As a result, we obtain an approximate
Energy/bit value of 0.16pJ/bit.
Table 2 compares our results with recent work. Ref. [7] shows good ML resistance, but the results are only for 10,000
CRPs as opposed to almost 200,000 CRPs collected for our work, for a wider temperature range. Additionally, the
RNN-PUF consumes less energy and has a higher FoM of 31% compared to 28% at worst case temperature of 80◦C.
For a fair comparison with the RNN-PUF using 8 columns, we have deduced the MLAA’s of [6] and [8] for the whole
array, rather than just single column pair. For a multi-column/column pair PUF we can use several ML attackers in
parallel, one for each column/column pair because each column/column pair is easily attacked, and therefore crack the
whole PUF.
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6 Conclusions
We have presented a Recurrent Neural Network strong PUF that is more resistant to ML attacks compared with
conventional PUFs. Recurrence along-with XOR operation introduces non-linearity which makes it difficult even for
advanced ML algorithms like Ensemble Classifiers to model the RNN-PUF. We analyzed the trade-offs and came up
with a design guide to optimally design the RNN-PUF. Reducing MLAA came at a cost of reducing reliability, but the
gap between reliability and attack accuracy is large and positive enough to choose the RNN-PUF over a conventional
PUF. Power consumption is kept low due to sub-threshold operation of the current mirrors, making the RNN-PUF
attractive for use in IoT devices. For future work, we will be implementing the RNN-PUF as a mixed-signal ASIC and
will try using RNN algorithms to perform ML attack on the PUF.
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